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1CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE BY PUBLIC
INVESTMENT IN THE TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE OF TRANSIT ECONOMIES
AND BY ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
Thomas Ziesemer, Maastricht University, MERIT and Department of
Economics, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. Tel.:
31 - 4 3 - 3883872, Fax: 31-43-3216518, E-mail:
T.Ziesemer@Algec.unimaas.NL . 
Abstract: In this paper we show conditions under which the
accumulation of public infrastructure capital over time may create
the comparative advantage of the production of transport services
and destroy that of the production of goods in a market
equilibrium of a transit economy. We also show conditions under
which it will not change comparative advantage. Moreover, we also
show the conditions under which an environmental tax on pollution
from transport will shift the specialization back to the
production of goods. In the model used, specialization is
determined by: the productivity of the sectors; the transit
volume; the taxes raised for the use of roads; the world market
prices of goods and transport services; and environmental taxes.
Gains from trade are analysed and comparative-static properties
of globalization and tax policy are discussed.
  
This paper has been presented at the NAKE day, the KNIE day and
in an internal seminar. I am grateful for the comments received.
Responsibility is entirely mine.
     Note the difference in emphasis in these surveys. Haslinger1
and Ziesemer emphasize developing country experience. Glomm and
Ravikumar emphasize time-series investigations. Pfähler et al.
implicitly emphasize panel-data investigations and therefore are
a bit more sceptical on the relevance of extra investment.  
     Other literature on international trade with public inputs2
consists of contributions to static trade theory.
     McMillan (1978) considers the central planners optimum of3
an enhanced Ricardian textbook trade model. The level of the
stock of a public factor determines the productivity of the two
sectors. The investment in the stock of public factors is
produced using labour and the stock itself. We consider the
market equilibrium of a transit economy with one good in the
utility function. The second good is international transport
services which pollute the natural environment. The stock of
public factors in our model enhances only the productivity of the
transport sector. 
2
CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE BY PUBLIC
INVESTMENT IN THE TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE OF TRANSIT ECONOMIES
AND BY ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
1. Introduction
It widely accepted that there is a central role for governments
in the provision of public investment in infrastructure (see World
Bank 1990, 1991). However, what seems to be rather obvious from
a macroeconomic point of view (see Haslinger and Ziesemer 1996,
Glomm and Ravikumar 1997 and Pfähler, Hofmann and Bönte (1996) for
surveys) , may be a bit more problematic once public factors1
benefit some sectors more than others or are even sector specific.
In this case public investment may have an impact on the
specialization of sectors and may even change the trade pattern
of a country (see McMillan 1978) . However, McMillan does not2
provide a detailed discussion of the conditions under which the
trade pattern does or does not change in his dynamic Ricardian
trade model. 
In this paper we provide a detailed discussion of a transit
economy that has some Ricardian flavour, and at the same time
include features other than those discussed in the model of
McMillan (1978).  A 'transit economy' is defined as an economy3
with a strong transport sector that is carrying out the transit
of goods from, e.g., an import harbour such as Rotterdam to the
‘hinterland’, say Germany. Alternatively, one could think of
natural resources that have to be transported somewhere from the
inside of, e.g., Latin America to the international harbours of
some Latin-American country. The public capital that is more or
less sector specific in the case of the Netherlands is embodied
in public roads, railways and airports. In the case of Latin
America one could think of the Hidrovia, a system of rivers going
through several Latin American countries to the coastal harbours.
A major problem with this type of transport infrastructure
investment is that it is directly (maybe in the case of Hidrovia)
     I am grateful to Luc Soete for drawing my attention to4
these examples.
     A summary can be found in the abstract and in section 9.5
     International transport costs have been modeled in various6
ways. Samuelson (1954) models them as a constant percentage of
wastage, called ice-berg costs in a so-called evaporation model.
Falvey (1976) makes them dependent on the cost of labour and
capital in the Heckscher-Ohlin manner with internationally
identical transport technologies. Casas (1983) has suggested a
production function employing capital and labour ‘from the
country of origin as well as from the country of destination’
‘with technology and market conditions determining each country’s
contribution’ ‘in a way that the Falvey model itself can be
viewed as a special case’. Mainwaring (1986) makes them dependent
on country-specific fixed labour coefficients and wages in the
Ricardian manner. In Casas and Choi (1989) they depend on the
costs of capital and labour, the factors used to make them, and
on economies or dis-economies which are external to the firm but
internal to the industry, which are captured by the output of the
transport sector used for the domestic and international
transport of all goods. In Alam (1991) unit-costs are dependent
on the trade volume of a partial equilibrium model.  
3
or indirectly (via the polluting transport sector) responsible for
environmental pollution.
Moreover, the relevance of the transit property of economies
is illustrated in the following $ cheesy $ example. A consumer can
buy Italian cheese in the Netherlands and in Denmark and can also
buy Dutch and Danish cheese in Italy. The intra-industry trade in
cheese between Italy on the one side and Denmark and the
Netherlands on the other requires the transport of cheese through
Germany and either Austria or Switzerland. Therefore, to some
extent Germany, Austria and Switzerland are also transit
economies, although the importance for Germany as a transit
economy is much less than for the smaller countries such as
Austria and Switzerland. When French truck drivers were on strike
and blockaded French highways it became evident that Belgian
automobile producers strongly depend on Spanish intermediate
goods. Thus to a certain degree France is also a transit economy.4
The transit function of the countries mentioned makes transport-
infrastructure capital very important for international trade.
In sum, the three major problems discussed in this paper are
(i) the conditions for the switch in specialization; (ii) the
effects of environmental policy in a transit economy and (iii) the
conditions required for the efficiency of public investment and
positive gains from trade in the dynamic setting of the model.5
McMillan's paper is the only contribution thus far on dynamic
theory of international trade and public inputs. This  paper adds
to the environmental policy dimension. It is the first, within
international trade theory, to make international transport costs
dependent on public investment . It adds to the small body of6
literature that allows explicit intertemporal changes in
specialization to be studied. Earlier contributions  were made by
DC	Y
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McMillan (1987) and Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993). 
In the following section the model is presented. In section
3 the special, stationary case of the model is analysed showing
the impact of the stock of public capital on specialization. In
section 4 the dynamics of the model are analysed as far as it is
independent of special parameter values. In section 5 the special
cases of the model are considered. This allows us to see under
which parameter values there will be a switch in specialization
from output production to that of transport services and under
which there will be none. In section 6 some cases are considered
under which an increase of environmental taxes may shift the
specialization back to the production of goods. In section 7
welfare under autarky and the gains from trade are considered.
Section 8 presents some comparative-static effects concerning
globalization and taxes. Section 9 summarizes and discusses some
topics for future research.  
2. The Model
Technologies
It is assumed that national trade has no transport costs but
international trade does. The production function of the domestic
sector for international transport is
where D is the transit volume, C aggregate consumption, Y output
production, C - Y is import of goods, K the exogenous capacity of
a truck, all in units of goods, t  (D + C - Y)/K the number of
transports, d(S) the duration of each transport dependent on the
stock of infrastructure capital, S, x the share of domestic firms
in the international transport of the country and 1-x the share
of foreign firms in a country's international transport. The left-
hand side of equation (1) denotes hours of transport services
delivered and the right hand side denotes the necessary labour
input, L . As both sides are measured in hours, equation (1) isT
a one-to-one technology. 
The duration function for a transit, d(S), as drawn in Figure
1, is assumed to have properties d' < 0, d'' > 0, lim  d(S) = ,S0
d() > 0. The assumption that the duration d(S) goes to infinity
if infrastructure S goes to zero ensures that the small country
modelled has no comparative advantage in transport if there is no
infrastructure.
S
Figure 1
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The decrease of transport time if infrastructure is enhanced
underlies decreasing returns to scale.
(2)
(3)
The reason for this specification is twofold. Driving at higher
speed does not only require a truck of better quality but also
requires higher quality roads such that it is possible to drive
faster if other cars are absent. In addition, a larger volume of
road capital may reduce congestion. Newbery (1988, p.167) reports
from empirical research that the possible speed decreases with the
number of cars but less strongly so the wider the lane is.  
The production function for output of goods is:
where H is the exogenous level of productivity and L  the labourY
input in goods production. 
The production function for net-investment in infrastructure
capital is assumed to be:
where a 'dot' denotes the time-derivative of a variable; 'a' is
a labour productivity parameter for gross investment in
infrastructure capital, and   is the rate of depreciation ofS
infrastructure capital which is assumed to be constant and given.
LP
LTLY
LSLP	L
0
pY	WLY
 pHLY	WLY0 or W/p  H
(p	p	tS	te)x(DC	Y)	 WLT0
(p	p	tS	te)K/d(S)	W0
     As such , for the remainder of the paper, this issue will7
only be mentioned in footnotes.
     This tax structure is chosen because it simplifies the8
analysis. Paying both tax rates per unit of hour using roads
makes the model much more complicated in the stability analysis
of the central differential equation (3) and its variants used
in the paper.
6
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Making the production function dependent on the usage of roads as
discussed in Newbery (1988) would not change the qualitative
nature of our results.    7
Resource- and budget constraints
We define:  
where L  is the labour available for production which can be usedP
in the production of transport services or goods. The labour
market equilibrium condition is:
Given the absence of fixed costs implicit in the assumptions of
the production functions above, we may assume free entry and
perfect competition. In the goods sector this assumption is made
to simplify the model whereas for road transport it is in
accordance with the evidence (see Quinet, 1993).
The non-positive-profit condition for the output producing
firm that was characterized by (2) is:
If the country produces the output Y the real wage rate is
determined by the labour productivity, H. If the real wage is
higher the country will perfectly specialize in the sense of not
producing good Y.
The non-positive-profit condition for the transport sector
is:
where p is the goods price before the transit, (p - p) is the
gross amount of money a transporter earns per unit of goods
transported, t  is a road tax paid for each unit of a good thatS
is transported, and t  is a tax for pollution per unit of a goode
transported.  If the wage is higher than the value of exogenous8
variables and the level of infrastructure allowed for, then the
t
e
x(DC	Y)  WL 
 pcL
WLS
tS(DC	Y)
x(p	p)D(1	x)tS(DC	Y)	[xp(1	x)p](C	Y)
0
     Relating pollution to hours of transport would give less9
pollution at lower d and higher S. However, a car would drive
faster and pollute more. The latter effect is not explicit in the
model but pollution modelled as increasing with the number of
goods takes out the above mentioned imbalance between hours and
speed. We include only that part of pollution on which the
country has an impact, that is its own ‘contribution’.  
7
(8)
(9)
(10)
firm will make losses and exit, which will imply specialization
in the production of goods. This will be shown in the next
section. The second formulation has been found by inserting
equation (1) for x(D+C-Y) into the first formulation and
cancelling out the labour term.
Households are assumed to have materialistic-green
preferences defined as U(c)-V[(D + C - Y)], which means that they
have utility from consumption per capita, c=C/L, and disutility
from pollution which is positively related to the number of goods
transported.  Transport firms pay environmental taxes in their9
home country by assumption. The environmental taxes are rebated
to households, who spend them together with wage income on
consumption goods. Their budget constraint is: 
Road taxes paid by foreign and domestic firms are assumed to
be used to pay wages of workers building the roads, which yields
the governments budget after cancellation of environmental tax
revenues and their rebatement to households:
This mechanism shifts the investment costs to the users. Given the
limited information governments can have, it may be more adequate
than a dynamically optimal tax scheme based on perfect information
analysis. The government is assumed to have determined the road
tax by some evaluation that is exogenous to this model. 
Finally, we have the trade balance. If transit is undertaken
by domestic firms with market share x ,transit is an export term,
x(p-p)D. Transport is done by foreigners with market share 1-x and
therefore the revenues from road taxes, (1-x)t (D+C-Y), can beS
viewed as an export of road services. Goods are imported and paid
by export revenues from transport or road services. If the
transport is by domestic firms, imported goods have to be valued
at foreign prices (e.g., as in Rotterdam) xp(C-Y). Finally, if the
goods are transported by foreign firms, the transport services are
also imported, leading to a valuation at domestic prices, (1-
x)p(C-Y). In sum, the trade balance can be written as:
The trade balance could also be derived by aggregating the budgets
of firms, households and the government. Therefore we have only
89 independent equations for the nine endogenous variables L , L ,p T
L , C(=cL), Y, S, L , W, and x. D, K, H, p, p, L, t  and t  areY S S e
exogenous variables and 'a' and   are S
parameters. 
Note that this model is designed in a way that does not allow
goods to be exported. The reason is as follows (proof by
contradiction): If goods were exported on net, then, to have trade
balanced, transport services would have to be imported. However,
foreign transporters cannot bring goods to domestic households
because goods are exported by assumption. If foreign transporters
bring domestic goods to foreigners this is a transaction between
foreigners which is not counted as trade. 
In short, in this model the country imports goods and exports
transport and/or road services. In all likelihood conventional
trade results could be derived by dis-aggregation of the goods
sector into several sectors. This is not undertaken, however, as
it is not the major purpose of this paper. Moreover, we would like
to point out that the transit volume D is exogenous and not
subject to any strategic action as it could be thought of in a
strategic game between main ports like Rotterdam, Hamburg and
others. 
Nevertheless, we next show that the economy can be perfectly
specialized either in the production of goods or in transport
services. Even if the country specializes in goods production, it
will import additional goods paid by the revenues from renting out
the roads, which is the case x=0 in equation (10). If their is
perfect specialization on transport (Y=0), there is no guarantee
that the domestic labour force is large enough for all the
transit; therefore x<1 is still possible or, in other words, if
all inhabitants of a country work either in transport or road
construction, their may still be foreign trucks on the domestic
road who pay taxes for using them. In the special case x=1, all
transit is done by domestic firms and the revenues are used to
import goods.   
This model has a rather special structure: it deviates from
the orthodox set up of having two goods in the utility function,
one of which is exported and the other imported. Instead goods are
always imported and transport services can be imported or
exported, whereas road services are either exported or not. For
the sake of simplicity we do not consider the possibility of
importing road services. Imagine that goods are delivered to a
foreign 'hinterland' country at the border where a foreign
transporter takes them over. This is the assumption made by
Herberg (1970). Of course the activities of domestic transporters
in foreign countries are cut off in a somewhat arbitrary manner,
but not doing so would complicate the analysis considerably
because a two-country model would be needed.
 A transit economy is open by definition. A closed economy
version of the model would therefore have no transit volume, D=0.
To better understand the model we look at a stationary
special case of the model, the properties of which are all
relevant for the dynamic version. 
451LT
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Low (high) taxes and a high (low) level of infrastructure capital
lead to specialization in transport services (goods production).
3. A stationary version of the model
We make the model stationary by fixing the level of
infrastructure, S, at an exogenous value, S . The change of S on*
the left-hand side of (3) therefore is zero and the amount of
labour necessary to keep the level S  constant is found from (3)*
as L  =  S /a. This in turn fixes L  in (5). L  then can beS S p p* *
allocated between transport and output according to equation (4).
This is drawn in the lower-left quadrant of Figure 2. The
production function (1) is drawn in the upper-left quadrant. As
one hour of labour input yields one hour of services delivered,
the function is a 45-degree line. The production function (2) is
drawn in the lower-right quadrant. The production functions and
the labour-input trade off allows us to derive the production
possibility curve, which has a horizontal intercept HL  and ap
vertical intercept L . The slope is therefore -1/H.p
Specialization
The producer price of goods is p and the producer price of
transport services (per labour hour and net of taxes) is (p - p -
t  - t )K/d(S). It follows from the non-positive profit functionsS e
(6) and (7) that the economy will specialize on transport (goods)
if (p - p -t  - t )K/d(S)  () W  () pH. Dividing the very left-S e
hand side and the very-right hand side by H and the price of
transport service hours yields:
1/H >(
,<) p(p	p	tS	te)K/d(S)
     t  is the price of exports per unit of good whereas10 S
t K/d(S) is the price of exports per hour of transport which hasS
been put on the vertical axis of Figure 2.
10
(11)
It can be seen from (11) that a relative-price line that is
flatter (steeper) than the production-possibility curve leads to
a specialization of production on transport (goods). The
alternative price lines have been drawn in Figure 2.
The relative price line has some similarity with the terms-
of-trade line in textbook theory. However, if the economy
specializes perfectly in output production, the country will rent
out road services and import goods at prices, p, including the
costs of the transport services. In this case the terms of trade
are [t K/d(S)]/p.  Therefore Figure 2 can be used in the usual wayS 10
to analyse specialization of production but trade has to be
analysed somewhat differently (see below).  
Specialization is explained now by many variables.
Productivity parameters H and K have the same impact as in the
simple  Ricardian textbook model. However, infrastructure and
taxes also have an impact. Higher taxes reduce the net prices of
transport and make it less competitive. A higher stock of
infrastructure capital, S , reduces the transport duration and*
therefore increases the competitiveness of the transport sector.
For sufficiently low values of infrastructure, S, the relative
price line would become very steep and therefore the model would
generate perfect specialization on production of goods (L  = 0).T
If taxes and infrastructure go up together, then the effect
depends on where the level of infrastructure is in terms of Figure
1. If it is low then the effect of reducing transport costs may
be stronger than that of raising taxes. However, if the impact on
the duration is low at high levels of S, then the effect of
taxation may be stronger. 
Allowing S and L  to move allows us to analyse changes in theS
specialization using the upper-right part of Figure 2. If S moves
by a change in L  over time then the labour-allocation line wouldS
shift inward or outward. This would not effect any of the slopes
in this figure except for that of the terms of trade - the slopes
will change for one because they are expressed as prices per
labour hour whereas they are given from the world market in terms
of transport costs per unit of a good and two because
infrastructure capital, S, changes. To the dynamics of
infrastructure capital we turn next. 
4. The Dynamics of the model  
In this section we will analyse the dynamic change in
specialization. The level of infrastructure capital, S, is assumed
to start at a low historical value, say close to zero where
transport is not profitable, and will reach a stationary value
that is either larger or smaller than that of imperfect
ÚS
atS[D(WLTe)/p	HLY]/W	/SS
ÚS
atS[DtSD/(p	tS)]/pH	/SS
     It may be helpful to point out that the rest of the world11
is assumed to be large and has constant steady-state levels of
infrastructure and of all other variables. The latter do not
change with the specialization of the small country considered.
Note that the rest of the world should not be modelled as one
that is almost identical to the transit economy considered (as
one usually does in trade theory). It is a ‘hinterland’, parts
of which have a transit property which vanishes once these
countries are aggregated to be a large ‘rest of the world’.  
     Appendices are available from the author upon request.12
They can also be downloaded from the Research Memorandum on
http://meritbbs.unimaas.nl.
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(3')
(3'')
specialization. At imperfect specialization (11) holds with
equality. If a stationary value is reached which is lower than the
value of imperfect specialization there will be no change in
specialization and the economy will always produce goods and no
transport services. However, if the stationary value is larger
than that of imperfect specialization, specialization will switch
to transport once the level of infrastructure capital has grown
from a low value to that of imperfect specialization.11
The procedure of the analysis is as follows. First, a
differential equation for the level of infrastructure is derived.
Second, the differential equation is analysed for the special
cases of the two perfect specializations of production. In
particular, the long-run stationary values of the two
specialization regimes are determined. Third, some cases of
special assumptions are made (in the next section) which allow to
determine the ranking of the size of the long-run values of
infrastructure for the two regimes of perfect and imperfect
specialization. For these cases it can be clearly concluded
whether or not there will be a switch in specialization.      
Successive insertion of L  from (9), C from (8) and Y fromS
(2) into (3) yields [with T  as an abbreviation for the first terme
of (8); see appendix 1 for a derivation ]12
We distinguish two special cases. First, if there is
specialization in the production of goods we have L  = 0, L  = L ,T p Y
T  = 0 and x = 0. Second, if there is specialization in transporte
services we have L  = 0, L  = L  and x  1. Y p T
In the first case, with specialization in goods, the second
equation of (6) holds with equality: W=pH. Inserting all the
relations that define the case into equation (3') we get (see
appendix 2 for a derivation): 
The stationary value of (3'’) for the specialization in goods
production can be written as:
S Y
atSD[1
tS
p	tS
]/(pH/S)
ÚS

atSd(S)
(p	p	tS	te)K
 DC[W(S)]!	/SS
C 

WL(p	p	tS)	tetSD
p(p	p	tS)te(tS	p)


(p	p	tS	te)KL(p	p	tS)/d(S)	tetSD
p(p	p	tS	te)tetS
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(p	p	tS	te)K/d(S)
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atSd(S)
K/S
DpLK(p	p	tS)/d(S)
p(p	p	tS	te)tetS
     The stability property would not be changed if the rate of13
depreciation,  , would be dependent on the intensity of the useS
of roads, D + C - Y, because this value is constant in this
regime, which can be seen from the derivation of (3'’), the first
term of which is constant but contained D+C-Y before the
manipulations of (3').  
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(3''')
(12)
(13)
(14)
which is larger than zero if and only if p - t  > 0 (see appendixS
3 for a derivation). For positive net prices of transport
services, which we will assume henceforth, this is always
fulfilled. It is obvious that the partial derivative of the right-
hand side of the differential equation with respect to S is
negative and therefore the stationary point is stable.   13
In the second case, C can be solved for from (8) and (10) as
a function of W (see appendix 4). Inserting L  from (9) and W fromS
(7) into (3), allows (3) to be written as:
with (see appendix 4):
 
with dC/dW > 0, and
  
with dW/dS > 0 because d'< 0.
The differential equation (3"’) has the stationary value:
 
However, at first sight it is anything but clear whether the
stationary value is stable. The reason is that the level of
infrastructure, S, appears three times in (3'''). The effects of
the first and the last impact are stabilizing, but the second is
not. We first give the formal derivation of (3''') with respect
0ÚS
0S


atSd
(S)
(p	p	tS	te)K
 DC[W(S)]!

atSd(S)
(p	p	tS	te)K
0C
0W
0W
0S
	/S
ˆS

[atSd(S)/S]D/K
p(p	p	tS	te)tetS
	/S
atSS
	1L(p	p	tS)
p(p	p	tS	te)tetS
     Again the uniqueness and stability property would not be14
changed if the rate of depreciation would depend positively on
usage measured by D+C-Y, because C depends positively on W which
in turn depends positively on S. The negative slope would be
there a fortiori. 
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(3 )iv
to S and afterwards the three effects are interpreted. The
derivative of (3''') with respect to S is:
The term in the first line can be interpreted as follows. An
increase in infrastructure capital, S, increases the productivity
of transport firms. This in turn increases the zero-profit-
equilibrium wage. At a higher wage less workers, L , can be hiredS
for a given amount of tax money. This reduces gross investment in
road construction. This effect therefore is stabilizing. However,
according to the second effect the wage increase leads to an
increase in consumption. As consumption goods are imported under
the specialization in transport in this case, the increase in
consumption induces an increase in transport. The increase in
transport enhances the revenue from road taxes, which is used for
hiring more workers for road construction. The consequent increase
in gross investment in infrastructure capital reinforces the
initial effect and is therefore destabilizing. The third effect
is depreciation which, of course, is stabilizing. 
 After some manipulation it is possible to show (see appendix
5) that equation (3''') can be rewritten as: 
Higher values of S result in a lower right-hand side of (3 ).iv
Therefore this differential equation is stable.  Equations (3'')14
and (3 ) have a similar graph the principal form of which isiv
indicated in Figures 3 and 4.
The crucial question to be treated next is whether the steady
stated reached will be S  or S . Y T
Y14
A sufficiently low value of (i) labour productivity in goods
production, H, (ii) rate of depreciation of transport
infrastructure,  , and a sufficiently high value of (i) truckS
productivity, K, (ii) labour productivity in public investment,
a, (iii) the transit volume, D, lead to accumulation of public
capital until S , while the economy is specialized on goodsI
production. At S , specialization switches to transport services.I
Imports, road-tax revenues and investment in public capital jump
up and then S moves to S .T
5. Dynamic changes of the trade pattern by growth of
infrastructure?
We define the value of S that will ensure that (11) holds with
equality and therefore allows for imperfect specialization as S .I
It follows from (11) and Figure 2 that the economy will specialize
in the production of goods if S < S  and in transport if S  < S.I I
While S goes from zero to S  there will be specialization on goodsI
production. When S exceeds S  specialization will switch toI
transport. This means that differential equation (3'') is valid
only to the left of S   and differential equation (3 ) only to theI iv
right of S  where they will be drawn as a solid line in theI
figures below. The crucial question therefore is whether or not
S will exceed S . S will not exceed S  if S  < S , because in thisI I Y I
case specialization in goods production will lead to a steady
state at S  before specialization switches. However, S will exceedY
S  if S  < S . In the latter case the development of S is describedI I Y
by (3'') as long as S < S  and by (3 ) when S  < S. When S  isI iv I I
passed there will be a jump
from (3'') to (3 ). What essentially has to be clarified is theiv
relative position of S  and S .Y I
It can be readily seen from equations (11) and the solution
for S  that the relative position of S  and S  depends on theY Y I
productivity parameters H, K, 'a' and   for goods, transport andS
road construction; world economic conditions D, p and p; the
policy variables t  and t ; and the size of the economy, L. ToS e
     Note that here and in the following, unclear ranking of15
the steady-state values always occurs in situations when one of
them would be in the range of the stippled lines of the graph
where the respective differential equation to which they belong
does not really exist in the strict mathematical sense.
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disentangle their respective effects we consider the special cases
in which these parameter values are either very high or very low.
The discussion of high environmental taxes will be carried out in
the next section. It will turn out to be useful to imagine that
the effects discussed in this section appear at low or no
environmental taxes. In the next section the dynamics considered
in this section are combined with environmental taxes.   
Low and high productivity in the production of goods  
If H  0 () then the left-hand side of (11) goes to infinity
(zero), which requires that S  goes towards zero (infinity), andI
S  goes to infinity (zero). S  is not effected by H. Y T
For sufficiently low values of H we get S  < S  < S . ThisI T Y
case is drawn in Figure 3 , where (3'') is denoted as YY (after
dividing both sides by S) and (3 ) as TT. To the left of S  theiv I
economy specializes in goods production and creating the
comparative advantage of the transport sector it moves along the
YY curve until S  is reached. There it jumps - destroying theI
comparative advantage of the goods sector - to the TT curve where
the transport sector has comparative advantage and moves on TT
until it stops moving at S . This jump must be a jump upward of LT S
in (3) for the following reason. Wages are constant at W = pH
before the switch. At S  they are identical for bothI
specializations. After the switch wages move gradually with S but
never jump. According to (8), however, there is a jump in
consumption because specialization jumps to transport (x jumps
from 0 to positive values) and therefore transporters pay
environmental taxes and in (9) Y jumps to zero. Therefore there
must be an upward jump in L  (even if environmental taxes are atS
zero).  
For sufficiently high values of H we get S  < S  < S . ThisY T I
case is drawn in Figure 4, where the TT curve is a stippled line
until S  because it is valid only to the right of S . The economyI I
moves along the YY curve until S  and no switch will take place.Y
Transport does not gain a comparative advantage and the goods
sector does not loose it. 
Low and high productivity in transport services 
If K  0 () (11) requires S    (0), C goes to zero (infinity)I
in the transport regime and S  goes to infinity (remains finite).T
S  is not affected by K. For sufficiently low values of K we findY
S  < S , S . Specialization will remain on goods production and theY I T
dynamics will be as in Figure 4 although the relative position of
S  and S unclear . For sufficiently high values of K we find S  <I T 15 I
S , S . Although the relative position of the two steady-stateY T
values is unclear, the dynamics will be as in Figure 3 because the
curvature of YY to the right of S  is irrelevant.I
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A sufficiently high value of (i) labour productivity in goods
production, H, (ii) the rate of depreciation of public capital,
 , (iii) the price of goods, p, (iv) the road tax, t , andS S
sufficiently low values of (i) truck productivity, K, (ii) labour
productivity in public investment, a, and (iii) transit volume D
lead to public capital accumulation from S  to S , where the0
Y
economy remains specialized in goods production.
Low and high productivity in road construction
If 'a'  0 () S  is not affected, S   0 () and S   0 (). ForI T Y
sufficiently low values of 'a' we get the ranking S , S  < S  andT Y I
therefore no switch occurs. Again the dynamics of Figure 4 are
relevant although the relative positions of the steady-state
values are unclear. For sufficiently high values of 'a' the
ranking is S  < S , S . In this case again the dynamics of FigureI T Y
3 are relevant although the relative positions of the steady-state
values are unclear again.    (0) has the same effects as 'a' S
0 (). It is left to the reader to check this. 
World economic conditions
If D  0 () this has no impact on S  according to (11). S  goesI Y
towards zero (infinity) and S  goes to some finite (infinite)T
level. For sufficiently low values of D we get the ranking S  < S ,Y I
S . The process will stop at S  as drawn in Figure 4 although  theT Y
relative positions of the steady-state values are unclear.
For sufficiently high values of D we get S  < S , S . In thisI T Y
case the dynamics of Figure 3 are also relevant although the
relative positions of the steady-state values are again. 
If p  , S  will satisfy 1/H = d(S)/K. S  and S  will goI Y T
towards zero. The process will be as in Figure 5 although the
relative position of the steady-state values is unclear.
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Taxes
If t  = 0 and net transport prices (p - p - t )  0 becausee S
of high t , (11) requires that S  goes to infinity, and S  and SS I Y T
will have some finite level. No switch in specialization will take
place and the dynamics will again be as in Figure 5.  
Country size
The size of L has no clear impact on specialization because L has
no impact on S  and S . However, it has an impact on S  andI Y T
therefore an impact on the ranking of the two steady state values.
This can be seen from comparing Figures 5 and 6 below.
In sum, if productivity, world economic conditions and taxes are
(un-)favourable for the transport sector, there will be
specialization on transport (goods) in the long run because the
critical value of infrastructure, which determines specialization
will be low (high).
  
6. Dynamic changes in the trade pattern by environmental policy
A rise of environmental taxes will be unfavourable for the
transport sector in the sense that the net price of transport will
decrease. It is clear from equation (11) that such an increase of
the environmental tax may shift the specialization from transport
services towards goods production. If specialization is in goods
production nothing will change, because t  will not affect S . Thee
Y
only interesting cases are those where the economy is specialized
in transport services. 
In the following we imagine that there are two phases of
'history': The first phase with low or no environmental taxes is
captured by the dynamics as drawn in Figures 3 and 4. The second
phase can be imagined as the dynamics initiated by a rise in
environmental taxes if the economy had come to a steady state in
the first phase.
Consider the case of low productivity H and high transit
volume D as it was captured by Figure 3. A sufficiently strong
rise of environmental taxes will shift the TT curve and S  to theI
right. In Figure 5 the new values are indicated by an accent.
Suppose the starting point were S . As this starting point is toT
the left of the new imperfect specialization value S ', the I
Figure 5
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      This ranking can be explained as follows. S  is16 Y
independent of K and L. A sufficiently high value of K can drive
S  below S . S  is independent of L. For any value of K thatI Y I
ensures S  < S  a sufficiently high value of L in (3 ) ensuresI Y iv
that S  is larger than S  which yields this ranking. In a steadyT Y
state this means that more people work in either transport or
goods production and change jobs with a switch in specialization.
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For sufficiently low values of labour productivity in goods
production, H, and sufficiently high values of the transit volume,
D, a sufficiently strong increase of environmental taxes shifts
S  to high levels such that re-specialization in goods productionT
occurs. Raising environmental taxes decreases wages and imports;
investment in road construction becomes cheaper which induces a
jump in dS/S. 
specialization will jump to goods production, i.e. to the line 
YY. The economy will move to S . Raising environmental taxesY
induces a switch in specialization implying a drop in wages
allowing more workers to be hired. This effect dominates that of
consumption reduction from lower wages and the switch in
specialization brings Y from zero to some positive value in
equation (9) on imports. This follows from the fact that S  < ST Y
and implies that at S  the YY curve has a higher position than TT.T
Therefore there must be an upward jump in the beginning of the new
process. In other words, low H ensures S  < S  and high D ensuresI T,Y
S  < S  leaving high both transport service hours delivered andT Y
road tax revenues.
Next, we consider the case where truck capacity K and labour
endowment L are large enough to yield the ranking  S  < S  < S  in16 I Y T
the first phase. This case is summarized in Figure 6. The economy
will move on the YY curve until S  during the first phase. Then itI
jumps to the TT line because specialization switches and the
movement goes to S . If an environmental tax shifts the TT lineT
Figure 6
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19
With high truck productivity, K, and a large country size L,
infrastructure capital moves from S  to S , switches specialization0
I
and moves on towards S  if there are no or low environmentalT
taxes. A sufficiently strong introduction of environmental taxes
induces a negative growth of public capital towards S . Y
such that S ' and S ' are in a position to the right of S , thenI T T
specialization shifts to goods production and the movement on the
YY curve goes backward to S . The decrease in wages according toY
(7) decreases income and consumption. In this case, the moment
the environmental tax is introduced the decrease of imports
dominates the change of wages such that imports, road tax revenues
and investment in road construction are all going down, because
large L leads to high production and very low imports.
7. Autarky and gains from trade
To be able to study the gains from trade and from public
investment we first analyse the autarkic temporary utility level
which will be used as a benchmark later.
Under autarky there is no transport by assumption. Therefore
reinvestment into infrastructure capital makes no sense and the
corresponding labour inputs, L  and L , will be zero. Consequently,T S
there will be perfect specialization on goods production.
Equations (4) and (5) degenerate to L = L  = L . Output must be Yp Y
= HL and wages are W = pH. Nominal income can also be written as
WL = pHL = pC = pY. Real consumption per capita then is c = C/L
= H. The utility level under autarky in the absence of pollution
from transport therefore is:
U(H) - V(0) 
Next we consider the temporary utility levels under free
trade for the two phases of specialization.
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If there is specialization on goods production, x = 0, (8)
and (6) imply c = W/p = H. (9) implies D + C - Y = WL /t . UsingS S
the same value of L  as in (3 ) we get D + C - Y = pHD/[(p -S ii
t )H]. Temporary utility for specialization in goods productionS
therefore is:  
U(H) - V{ pHD/[(p - t )H] }S
Temporary utility during the first phase is smaller than that of
autarky. The reason is simply that in the special case of this
model the production point is unchanged by shifting to free trade
except for some workers who are reallocated towards road
construction. Specialization under autarky and under free trade
is on goods production and therefore real wages and consumption
are at the same level in both cases, namely H. The export revenues
from renting out road services t x(D + C - Y) are used to importS
goods the value of which equals the consumption of road workers.
In other words, what one might have expected to be the gains from
trade is used for paying workers who work on the road construction
investment projects, which shifts gains into the future, provided
specialization in transport is achieved later where a higher level
of infrastructure capital S yields higher wages. Foreign
transporters pay environmental taxes at home. 
In sum, there is nothing that changes per capita consumption
when the economy goes from autarky to free trade. But
international transport is allowed for now and it pollutes the
natural environment. This decreases the temporary utility as long
C*
U - U(H)
H
C
  V(D) 
- V(0)
C
  Figure 7
V(D + C) - V(0)
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Utility from consumption under specialization on transport must
exceed that of autarky by more than that of disutility from
pollution.
as specialization is on goods production. During this first phase
neither free trade nor public investment are welfare enhancing.
Of course, if one dis-aggregates the goods production sector of
this model in accordance with assumptions of standard textbook
trade models then there will also be gains from trade in this
model. The gains from trade in this model therefore should be
interpreted as additional gains from transport or road services.
The utility level under specialization on transport is 
U[C(W)/L] - V[D + C(W)] (16)
with C according to (12) and W according to (13). Consumption per
capita is higher under this specialization than under that in the
first phase, because (6) now implies that W > pH and there may be
environmental tax revenues which are rebated to households. It
follows then from (8) that per capita consumption in the second
phase is higher than with W = pH and no environmental tax revenues
in the first phase of goods production. Both utility from
consumption and disutility from pollution are larger in this
second phase than under autarky, because under autarky pollution
is zero. A critical necessary condition for free trade to be
beneficial therefore is   
U[C(W)/L] - U(H) > V[D + C(W)] - V(0)
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This means that the higher utility from consumption on the left-
hand side must dominate the higher disutility from pollution. This
case is drawn in Figure 7 under the additional assumptions U'>0,
U''<0, V'>0, V''>0. 
Three conditions are required for free trade to be
beneficial. First, public investment in infrastructure, S, must
bring the economy into the trade pattern of specialization on
transport. Second, utility functions must be such that there is
a range of values of per capita consumption (H,c) in which U is
larger than V and the economy must be in this range when it is
specialized on transport services. Third, having welfare losses
during the first phase and welfare gains in the second, the
somehow discounted gains must outweigh the losses and this
difference must be larger than utility under autarky.
 Similarly, public investment is beneficial only if there is
free trade - because under autarky transport infrastructure is
useless under the assumption of no transport costs - and economic
conditions that make public investment beneficial must be the same
as those that make free trade beneficial.
Free trade and public investment appear simultaneously and
therefore their benefits depend on the same necessary conditions:
the economy must go on to specialize in transport and must be in
a range of consumption values where U > V, and discounting of the
future should not reverse this. If one of these conditions is not
met, then neither free trade nor public investment can be
beneficial.   
8. Some comparative-static effects
Maybe it would be desirable to check what the dynamically
optimal policy could be. However, maximizing welfare subject to
(3'') and either (3''') or (3 ) choosing t  and t  is complicatediv e S
by the fact that (3'') is strongly convex in t . Moreover, givenS
the fact that we have introduced t  as a short cut device of aS
government that has imperfect information and therefore decides
to tax the use of roads using the tax revenues for investment in
road construction, it is not very attractive to now shift to an
assumption of perfect information. 
However, some interesting comparative-static effects can be
identified. We concentrate on the second phase because of its
crucial role in generating welfare and because taxes and the
transit volume - on which we shall concentrate - have an impact
mainly on the transport sector, which the economy specializes on
in this phase. We distinguish between the effects on U - V
according to (16) in the second phase for a given value of S and
the effect on S in (14) or the shift of (3 ) as drawn in Figureiv
3 respectively. 
Globalization
An increase of D from ongoing globalization has a direct
impact on pollution and its disutility. Its effect on C for a
given S according to (12) is:
0> 0C
0D
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     Unfortunately we have been unable so far to construct any17
special cases which would give some clear-cut results. Without
numerical analysis it seems to be impossible at the moment to get
any additional insight.
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(17)
The intuitive reason why consumption is decreasing is that in (10)
c.p. there is a decrease of the share in the transport market, dx
< 0 if dD > 0. This reduces environmental revenues in (8), where
the indirect effect via x is stronger than the direct effect of
D which would increase environmental revenues. Concerning
pollution the direct effect of D is stronger than the indirect
effect that dD > 0 decreases consumption and therefore imports and
pollution. Therefore dD > 0 has a negative effect on U and a
positive effect on V implying that U - V is decreasing for a given
S. For a given S globalization, dD > 0, would therefore be
damaging. However, an increase of D, dD > 0, would shift the graph
of (3 ) upward and to the right and therefore would increase theiv
steady-state value of S and of wages in the transport
specialization regime. Taking the impact of D on S into account,
the effects of D on utility can be written as:
 
with 0C/0D < 0 according to (17), 0C/0S > 0 from (12) and 0S/0D >
0 from (14). Two scenarios will yield a positive effect of D on
utility. One must either have preferences which are more
materialistic than green, U'-V'>0, and a strong effect of D on S
and of S on C and a low V' or one must have preferences more green
than materialistic, U'-V'< 0, and a weak effect of D on S and S
on C and again a low V’.  However, if t  = 0, we get 0C/0D = 0,17 e
and preferences which are more green than materialistic, U’ - V’
< 0, are a sufficient  condition for a negative welfare effect of
globalization.   
 
Environmental and road taxes
Taking the derivative of C in (12) with respect to either road
taxes or environmental taxes one can show that an increase of both
tax rates reduces consumption for any given level of
infrastructure capital, S: 0C/0t  < 0. However, it can be seene,S
from (14) that an increase of environmental taxes on the long-run
value of S is positive which in turn has a positive impact on
consumption. Again the net effect on utility depends on the sign
of U'-V' and on the relative strength of the short and long-run
effects.
Besides environmental taxes, road taxes could be an
interesting policy instrument to increase public sector capital.
As long as environmental taxes are low, it is instructive to look
at the case where they are zero. A first direct ceteris paribus
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effect of higher road taxes is to generate more revenues to hire
more road workers. Wages are decreased by road taxes for a given
level of infrastructure. However, considering (14) with no
environmental taxes shows that the net effect on the steady state
value of infrastructure capital is positive despite the fact that
transporters pay the costs themselves. This in turn increases
wages. In the case of no environmental taxes, in the first
equation of (12) consumption depends on road taxes only via
wages. Consequently with an unclear effect on wages the effect on
consumption is also unclear. If transporters would not pay for the
use of roads, road taxes had no impact on wages. In this case
infrastructure capital would be larger and so would consumption,
wages and pollution leading to a similar problem of valuing
material gains against environmental losses. However, once
transporters pay, all effects are much less clear. 
9. Summary and conclusion
In this paper we have looked at the effects of public investment,
if it is used only by one sector, on the trade pattern, pollution,
wages and welfare. 
In section 2 we set up a new model of a transit economy with
two sectors one of which is the transport sector that depends on
infrastructure capital financed by a road tax. 
In section 3 we show that the stock of public capital,
technology parameters and road and environmental taxes as well as
world market prices and the transit volume are the determinants
of comparative advantage in the short run. 
In section 4 we analysed the dynamics of the accumulation of
infrastructure capital that is driven by the mechanism of
financing road investment by road taxes. 
In section 5 we show that, roughly speaking, the stock of
public capital will shift comparative advantage to the transport
(goods) sector (under the mechanism of road financing by road
taxes) if other conditions concerning productivity, world market
and policy are also favourable for the transport (goods) sector.
However, the introduction of an environmental tax, treated
in section 6 is a disadvantage for the transport sector and may
shift the comparative advantage away from transport services to
goods production. The long-run level of public capital in the new
regime of goods production may be either higher (see Figure 5) or
lower (see Figure 6) than in the regime of specialization on
transport before the introduction of environmental policy. This
depends on which effect dominates - that of decreasing wages from
the tax or that of decreasing revenues from the change in
specialization. 
The welfare analysis in section 7 shows that welfare under
autarky is larger than welfare in the first phase of free trade
with specialization in goods because real wages and consumption
do not increase but imports and pollution do. In the second phase
if there is a switch to specialization in transport services,
utility from consumption as well as disutility from pollution are
higher than under autarky. If preferences value consumption
stronger than pollution in the second phase and do not discount
the second phase too strongly, then the overall evaluation of free
trade and public investment may be positive only if the losses of
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the first phase are low enough. 
Finally, the model shows that the welfare effects of
globalization, environmental and road taxes are anything but
obvious even when considering the second phase alone. In the short
term taxes have negative effects on consumption, but have an
opposite effects via the long-run value of infrastructure capital.
     Of course, all these results should be taken with caution
because of the specific nature of the model. In particular, in
future research we will investigate the modification of the
results for the case when the government has a second sector
specific investment opportunity such as investment in public
knowledge which increases productivity of goods production and may
foster pollution less than transport infrastructure does. In this
case the benefits of infrastructure investments will probably even
be lower than in the case of the model discussed above.
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(3')
APPENDICES (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Appendix 1
Insertion of L  from (9) into (3) yieldsS
Defining T   t x(D + C - Y) in (8) and dividing by p yieldse e
(T  + WL)/p = C  e
Insertion of (2) and C from the right-hand side of the last
equation into the previous differential equation yields
Of course, the first term on the right-hand side equals aL .    S
Appendix 2
Insertion of W = pH, T  = 0 and L  = L  into (3') yieldse Y p
To eliminate L - L  from this equation will deliver a differentialp
equation in S only. As the first term on the right-hand side is
aL = a(L - L ) we getS p
L - L  = t  [D + H(L - L )]/(pH)p S p
Solving for L - L  yields p
L - L  = t D/[(p - t )H]p S S
Insertion of this into the last version of the differential
equation yields (3'') in the text:
 
Appendix 3
For S  > 0 we must have {1 + t /[p - t ]}/pH > 0. MultiplyingY S S
numerator and denominator by [p - t ] yields [p - t  + t ]/{pH[p -S S S
t ]} > 0 if [p - t ] > 0.S S
Appendix 4
With the value of the wage, W, from (7), the zero profit condition
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of the transport firm, the household's budget constraint (8) and
the trade balance (10) are two equations for x and C. Solving (8)
for x yields
x = (pC - WL)/[t (D+C)]e
Solving (10) for x yields 
x = [-t (D+C) + pC]/[(p - p)D - t (D+C) - (p - p)C]S S
Equating the right-hand sides of the equations for x yields
(pC - WL)/[t (D+C)] = [-t (D+C) + pC]/[(p - p)D - t (D+C) - (p -e S S
p)C]
Solving for C yields:
 
Appendix 5
Dividing (3''') by S, inserting the results for C and W from
appendix 4, and carrying out the multiplication of the first of
the two terms in (3'') yields
Collecting d(S)-terms and cancelling (p - p - t  - t )K in theS e
second of the three lines above yields
ˆS
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Multiplying the numerator and the denominator of the first
fraction by p, recognizing that (1 - t t /[p(p - p - t  - t ) + tS e S e S
+ t ] = p(p - p - t  - t )/ [p(p - p - t  - t ) + t  + t ] ande S e S e S e
cancellation of the denominator of this term with that of the
first fraction yields (3 ) in the text.iv
